THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC SMALL-STATE STRATEGY AND IMMIGRATION

Sweden in the 21st Century

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Abstract: This study of neoliberal inclusion politics and policy in twenty-first century Sweden investigates how conservative-liberal tactics target, and dismantle, the institutionalization of relatively resilient socialist-feminist small-state governance. Analyzing authoritative conservative-liberal discursive tactics, particularly how they construct a state of moral emergency out of population change (immigration) within the high-capacity state and society, exposes their political target: How the state's capacity to include semi-sovereign labor, to relieve the economic and geopolitical limits upon citizenship, is girded by the state's internalization of social reproduction, particularly its capillary connections through female employment in a welfare state oriented to substantive rationality. Forged at the patrimonial-capitalist turn of the twentieth century, via socialist-women's movements alliance, to stem mass population hemorrhaging and allow stunted Swedish society and economy to develop, this targeted social-democratic governance crux is the basis for the small state's outsized capacity to moderate the society's, citizens', and residents' subjection to exploitation and appropriation within global monopoly capitalism's hegemonic geopolitics of militarized accumulation and resultant population dislocations.

Key words: immigration; neoliberalization; small-state strategy; social reproduction; Sweden

Social Reproduction Policy's Role in Small-state Integrity

Social democracy produces a complementary combination of expanding social citizenship and a high-skill, high-wage labor market (Esping-Anderson1990).

This is accomplished via the state taking an explicit, and socialist-feminist, role in supporting social and biological reproduction, including in husbanding immigration. Supporting reproduction is conducted, under the influence of labor union policy analysts, to correct for global population displacement, via refugee and family-reunification immigration, and to optimize human development, providing immigrants with the state support to develop their skills and keep their communities and families intact. In the early twenty-first century, as Nordic social democracies were critiqued heavily for their insufficient devotion to utilitarian metrics of progress, integration reformists, particularly those advocating convergence with conservative-liberalism, prosecuted an empirical case against Swedish social democracy, contrasting it not only to the US but also to what they extolled as a superior small-state model: Austria's liberal-conservative immigration model, where immigration was not recognized as a form of social reproduction, but instead held to optimize economic inclusion. Although there are empirically suspect ideological claims that economic participation linearly enhances human welfare, the two contrasting models-social inclusion for democratic development and social reproduction versus social inclusion as a simple product of economic inclusion-differ fundamentally on their utopian horizons: inclusion in a democratic developmental society, or inclusion in a society of stratified inclusion indifferent to human development. For small states, the social-democratic approach has developed a form of governmentality sensitive to both production and reproduction in capitalism. This allows it not only high capacity to incorporate newcomers but resilience to incursions upon its developmental sovereignty as well.

The Rebel Yell: Replace Social-Democratic Reproduction with Conservative-Liberal Reproduction

Swedes have introduced some variations on neoliberalizing immigration and integration politics. Swedish immigration and integration policy reformists, including Masoud Kamali, Annika Forsander, Mauricio Rojas, and Mikael Hjerm, suggested that in the Nordic welfare model more inclusive and more universal social benefits as well as more regulated labor markets make it more difficult for immigrants and other vulnerable groups like disabled people or those who are unemployed long term to "break in" (Forsander 2004, 219–20). They condemned labor movement achievements such as the welfare state and Sweden's high-quality labor market as being incapable of incorporating newcomers to reproduce society.

Borrowing from Durkheim's functionalist conception of organic solidarity, Kamali created a philosophical version of economist George Borjas' definition of integration in opposition to welfare dependency. Kamali claimed that the universalist Swedish welfare state and the middle-class men and women working in the

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welfare system chiefly work to clientelize and colonize non-European immigrants, preventing them from joining the civil sphere. To be sure, the civil sphere from which immigrants are marginalized is for Kamali solely *the market*. Kamali thus erased the ways in which, for example, rural-polity communist and union leaders and well-educated women in the public sector facilitate immigrant inclusion through myriad reproductive supports, including education. Integration for conservative-liberal reformers such as Kamali was presented as one, utilitarian type of economic integration, that is, "individuals' active participation in the production and reproduction of their own" (and their own female dependent's) "life with little or no dependence on state subsidies" (Kamali 1997, 11).

Annika Forsander further defended the segmented labor market. She asserted that social-democratic assimilation measures promote an ideology in which only through decent work is it possible to become a full citizen. Lacking access to decent work turns immigrants into a problem. It was because of social-democratic values that the integration methods of the Nordic welfare state includes education, assisted employment, apprenticeships, language courses, social education, and other measures to increase human and social capital (Forsander 2004, 218), an economic argument contrasting to a view of these measures as developing human potentials for full democratic citizenship. Liberal countries are free of these problem-solving approaches, Forsander argued, because they let immigrants be as they essentially are, which is culturally prolific. "In the US there is no ethnonational culture into which one must be integrated," Forsander (2004, 208) announced. Forsander cited Mauricio Rojas, Timbro Deputy President responsible for The Center for Welfare Reform at "the free-market think tank of Swedish enterprise," who asserted that integration policies in Sweden were misdirected in their efforts to foster equality (Rojas [1996] 1999), a misguided philosophical foundation of the Swedish welfare state, along with humanitarianism and mercy, rehabilitation, integration, solidarity, justice, and security (Samuelsson 1975). Presumably free of the constraints of community and institutions, Forsander's liberal states offer a smorgasbord of low-paying, low-skill jobs and ethnic occupational niches that, she imagined, provide immigrants with a legitimate (if second-tier) citizenship and, she also imagined, uniquely allow immigrants to escape being treated as a problem.

Hjerm, a sociologist at Umeå University, argued that because immigrant smallbusinessmen in the 1990s had on average less income than immigrant workers in Sweden, the social-democratic welfare state was not "as successful in incorporating immigrants as has been claimed" and so "the reshaping of the welfare state to meet the multicultural reality is a more fundamental and urgent task" (Hjerm 2005, 120, 136). "It stands clear," he speculated, "that the social democratic welfare state, built and expanded on grounds of homogeneity, is insufficient to deal with changing circumstances in a plural society" (117).

Hjerm admitted that the social-democratic government promoted entrepreneurship as a way for immigrants to circumvent labor market discrimination. But Hjerm described the state's promotion of entrepreneurship as a sinister effort to "hide" immigrants' problems. Blind to high business-failure rates in Anglo-liberal countries, Hjerm's argument implied that immigrant entrepreneurship would be automatically and lavishly rewarded in a more market-dominated society. Contributing to the conservative-liberal argument for reducing labor strength and transferring social wealth to capital, Hjerm suggested that greater public subsidy of immigrant businessmen's income would smooth immigration and integration.¹

The Official Sell: Neoliberals' Austrian Case against Social Democracy

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In the twenty-first-century neoliberal mobilization, claims that Sweden's socialdemocratic integration practices are too coddling, and its labor market too rewarding, were backed by the frequently cited multivariate analysis of Irene Kogan (2003). Kogan's study was cited to support the discussion of the large difference between ethnic Swedes' and immigrants' rates of employment, as well as to support the conclusion that for all its multicultural and social-democratic reproduction policies, Sweden's program of immigrant integration is a failure, and that more liberal regimes treat immigrants better. Newcomers, particularly refugee immigrants to Sweden along with young Swedes under 25, have had higher rates of unemployment since 1990. The study is salient because immigrant unemployment has been a cost to the welfare state, and it has presented problems to immigrants and immigrant communities, mixed outcomes for ethnic Swedes, and opportunities for political reformists seeking to induce further neoliberalization toward capitalist conservative liberalism. Because Kogan's work was often cited by political agents claiming that social democracy undermines immigrants' welfare,² I analyze the study below to see how well it supports that claim. Much of the public shame over racism and discrimination in Sweden has not been as helpful to immigrants as to political agents who seek to weaken labor, and policy scholars played an important role in this. Given the prominent role Kogan's findings played in the critique of social democracy, I demonstrate the importance of fully discussing the impact of composition and contextual effects when taking lessons from cross-national comparisons. "Composition" refers to the characteristics of individual members of a population and "context" to the contextual environment of individuals.

Using data from only 1996 and 1997, *just prior to Sweden's economic recovery* from a deregulated finance crisis, Kogan contrasts the economic outcomes of the fresh flood of educated Yugoslavian men *and women* refugees in Sweden against



those of the constant influx of mostly male, poorly educated, German-speaking, former Yugoslavia-originated labor immigrants in Austria. She finds that while the refugees originating from the republics of former Yugoslavia in Sweden have better jobs, the traditional, temporary influx of young, male labor immigrants to Austria has a higher employment *rate*, albeit confined in low-end jobs. Such "junk" jobs are the signature labor market of neoliberalism, the conservative restoration of liberalism, in its pursuit of a social order including working-class people as a global warehouse of just-in-time, low-cost production components.

Kogan's neoclassical-economic small-state immigration model comparison was fundamentally an argument contrasting two different approaches to social inclusion, approaches reflecting distinctive normative conceptualizations of the relationship between states and classes, short-term income and social human development. The particular awkwardness of Kogan's comparison was facilitated by neglecting, or keeping implicit, well-theorized composition and contextual effects. Not only did Kogan tactically select a tiny, loaded data window-frame (1996–1997) for her comparison. To contrast apples and oranges in favor of oranges, Kogan's argument tactically played down the widely understood difference between refugees and labor immigrants' labor market attachment. Chiswick (1999) hypothesizes that because refugees do not emigrate for purely economic reasons, but rather their movement is pushed by instability and political repression in their countries of origin (which can have macroeconomic roots), they are likely to be less favorably selected than economic migrants for specific host-country labor market needs and may perform less well on the labor market, at least in the economist's short time frame.

Yugoslavian immigrants to Sweden (i.e., the immigrants of all nationalities living in former Yugoslavia) were not always refugees, however. Western European countries signed labor contracts with Mediterranean countries in the 1960s and 1970s (see Fassman and Munz 1994), though Sweden dropped this kind of labor immigration in 1973. The pre-1973 Yugoslavian labor immigrants to Sweden had low-status jobs similar to their labor immigrant counterparts in Austria. Historically, young male Yugoslavian labor immigrants in Sweden and Austria fared similarly in both countries, as both countries exerted what Borjas (1988) terms "negative selection." That is, this immigrant population was selected for its lower productivity and skills. Young male labor immigrants originating from Yugoslavia had high employment rates in both the social-democratic country and in Austria.

Kogan mentions that the comparatively low unemployment rate of the Yugoslavian immigrants in Austria can be attributed to the difference between the Swedish policy of allocating welfare to the unemployed, versus the Austrian policy that removes unemployed immigrants from the country, and thus from the

unemployment statistics. However, rather than acknowledging deportation as antithetical to integration, Kogan casts it in a more idealist spirit, as "discouraging unemployment" (Kogan 2006, 601).

In addition to the contextual effect of Austria removing unemployed immigrants where Sweden does not, there are additional community and contextual effects to note in Kogan's study. A prominent community effect is that Yugoslavian immigrants have a tradition of steadily immigrating to nearby Austria; this goes back to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, continues strongly through the Cold War period, and then continues strongly through the 1990s wars within the former Yugoslavia. Austria is a workplace away from home for Yugoslavian migrants, comparable to the US for many Mexican migrants or to Canada for many Filipina migrants, but in a more venerable tradition, and without the great, disruptive distances.

In contrast, immigration from what was then Yugoslavia to Sweden has been limited to a mid-twentieth-century labor immigration influx and a 1990s refugee influx. Yugoslavian immigrants do not have an equally strong, traditional community presence within more distant Sweden as they do in neighboring Austria. The importance of community networks to immigrant employment emerges in how jobs are acquired. In Sweden, immigrants from distant countries are much more likely to have to use formal channels to acquire jobs than are ethnic Swedes. Nearly 40% of immigrants from outside Western countries have to secure their job through formal processes, compared with just 26% of ethnic Swedes. Furthermore, 42% of ethnic Swedes but only 34% of non-Western immigrants are able to use informal networks to land a job (Behtoui 2004). Without a substantial, existing ethnic network, economic integration can be more costly and risky, as immigration social network theorists point out (see Howe and Jackson 2006, 25; Portes and Rumbaut 1996; van Tubergen, Maas, and Flap 2004; Zhou and Logan 1989).

The ultimate contextual effect poses a critical problem for drawing conclusions about immigrant economic integration. It should be regarded as a major research design flaw—and rather hopelessly anti-scientific—that Kogan compares immigrant unemployment rates in two ideal years of an economic crisis in Sweden and an economic boom in Austria. Unsurprisingly, in the short time frame Kogan deployed in her argument, older migrants from former Yugoslavia stayed working in Austria's labor market during its 1990s *boom*, whereas their counterparts in Sweden were more likely to exit the marketplace during the 1990s Swedish neoliberal economic *shock*. Before we can pronounce social democracy the foe of immigrants, the presence of contextual effects requires us to extend our view on comparative integration outcomes past 1996 (Austria) and 1997 (Sweden).

Looking past 1996–1997, Sweden's economy improves and is arguably more dynamic than the Austrian Catholic-conservative model it is compared with. In the context of Sweden's redistributive social-democratic welfare state, Sweden's



economic successes have positive implications for long-term immigrant welfare. When the social-democratic state was more autonomous, prior to the 1990 economic shock, unemployment was lower, per social-democratic policy proper. In the years before the shock was applied, ethnic Swedes enjoyed an 87% employment rate, and immigrants enjoyed a 76% employment rate. There was an employment rate gap, but with such low unemployment, it made little political impact. The gap opened wider at the first crack of the crisis in 1990. Then the Social Democratic Party (SAP) was returned to head the state in 1994. The SAP reversed the bourgeois government's "starve the beast" (bankrupt the welfare state) program and the social-democratic policies set the country back on its feet.

Overall, the good-cop/bad-cop flow of neoliberal reform in Sweden has pleased the global business community, which sees much opportunity in the affluent country for privatization. In 2006–2007, the World Economic Forum's "Global Competitiveness" Index placed Sweden in third place, after Finland and Switzerland. In contrast, Austria's economic promise to capital ranks at number 17. Despite the inherent advantages of the young, male, relatively local, linguistically fluent immigrants in the 1996 Austrian integration model, refugees in Sweden make more impressive strides over the long haul. Kogan likewise finds that second-generation immigrants do uniformly well on the labor market across the two countries.

When Neoliberals Go Gender Blind

Data on immigrant labor market exclusion in Sweden seem to be the strongest empirical case for the neoliberal argument against the Nordic model. In the neoliberalization era, unemployment has been contained within the immigrant communities and among under-25 youth. Such containment could be an ad hoc attempt to both meet the letter of neoliberal anti-inflationary policies and quarantine the full labor-disciplining force of anti-inflationary/unemployment policy among both kinds of newcomers, because social democracy requires a solidaristic, politically engaged, and empowered working class, where patrimonial capitalism coheres elites atop a disrupted working class. It is, nonetheless, still misleading to simply argue that the immigrant employment rate is sacrificed to fight inflation while maintaining social-democratic labor strength.

Why was there an employment gap between immigrants and natives in Sweden? There has been an important, hidden gender component to the immigrant-native employment gap in Sweden. Taking gender into account clarifies an important source of disparity between New Swede and ethnic Swede employment rates. A good deal of New Swedes' apparently higher unemployment is explained by the *very high employment of Swedish women*. The excellent public-sector

accommodations allowing for women's comfortable inclusion in the labor market are part and parcel of the socialism-fueled social-democratic sensitivity to social and biological reproductive conditions in capitalism, a resilience strategy pioneered by the Nordic small states. The social-democratic welfare state, as described by Gosta Esping-Anderson, functioned on the basis of "three interlocked principles: 1) the improvement and expansion of (public) social, health, and educational services; 2) maximum employment-participation, especially for women; and 3) sustained full employment."3 From daycare, public K-12 and postsecondary education, to parental leave and job security, social-democratic state policies supporting the maximum employment of women in decent public-sector jobs accomplishes multiple social human development goals. First, they permit women independence from a patrimonial protection racket while allowing all genders to participate fully in family life and in the life of the community and polity. Second, the integration of women workers into the public sector tactically permits the small state buffering against and *independence* from international financial power-pressure. Even in the face of the international capitalist class's-including bankers, its media and political mobilizers, including neoclassical economists, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the European Union (EU)-intense, unrelenting, tactical power-pressure to neoliberalize the state and policy, and even in the contemporary absence of a credible alternative to patrimonial global monopoly capitalism, almost each and every Swedish family has considerable incentive to stand behind solidarism through the state, because except within Sweden's small, tight capitalist class, Swedish family income and lifestyle are dependent upon women's decent jobs and networks in the state. This is a targeted, protective capillary-coordination governmentality tactic for a small, otherwise-vulnerable state once on the periphery of capitalism. It was available through early socialist socialdemocratic strategists' dialectical-materialist and feminist recognition that capitalist growth through exploitation must operate on a "periphery," an out-of-sight-out-of-mind appropriation of women's and nature's work, and that to pursue human development within a small state in a capitalist global economy requires internalizing *both* the conditions of production and reproduction.

Starting in its foundation in both socialist and women's (e.g., temperance) movements, actually existing social democracy recognizes both exploitation and appropriation aspects of capitalism; therefore, Sweden has among the best job market outcomes for *women* immigrants in the OECD. Yet immigrants' chances on the labor market appear relatively low in Sweden because its female labor market is among the strongest in the OECD, and the employment rate of ethnic-Swed-ish women is *the* highest in the OECD. There has been an especially marked difference in Sweden between the levels of employment of ethnic-Swedish women (75% in 2003) and immigrant women (60% in 2003). Low female immigrant

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employment is not atypical. As Pierette Hondagneu-Sotelo (1994) has shown, when spouses and children migrate together, as they commonly do in refugee and family migration to Sweden, patriarchal patterns are likely to be maintained. Immigration economist Heather Antecol (2000) confirms that immigrant women's labor force activity tends to be reflective of gender differences in labor force activity in their countries of origin. Adjustment is required.

Regardless of the state of the welfare system, immigrant women often have it tough on the job market. Even the most high-skilled immigrant women in even the most laissez-faire market societies have difficulty finding appropriate work to justify their migration sacrifices (Pessar 1999, 64; Waldinger and Gilbertson 1994).⁴ It also should be recognized that to remain outside of the labor market is a common immigrant women's strategy across countries. It allows them to work against social forces that threaten poor, minority families (Pessar 1999, 67). In short, the native-women/immigrant-women employment gap has held across all OECD countries, except for in Austria, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece, because they all have low rates of native women's employment matching their low rates of immigrant women's employment. Unsurprisingly, these Catholicconservative countries are choosing gender inegalitarianism as the axis upon which to allocate employment and patriarchal appropriation. Comparing immigrant employment across OECD countries, and bringing into the light women's employment data within this comparison, it is apparent that we are not observing simple success or failure of immigrant economic integration, but rather the tradeoffs of different political-economic development strategies that impact not only racial formation, but gender and class as well (see Table 1).

Most OECD states⁵ with a strong female presence in the labor force, including Sweden, employ native men at a higher rate than immigrant men. The exceptions are two large, traditional immigration countries, Canada and the United States, with both relatively high levels of native female employment and high rates of immigrant male employment. Relatively low levels of native male employment (less than 75%) coincide with even lower comparative rates of native female employment. In the Catholic countries, Austria is unique in that it has both low native female employment (61.3%) and native male employment that hovers just above 75%. Relying on a male breadwinner wage and women's (typically) most productive years for delivery of unremunerated reproductive care, no Catholicconservative state has 65% or more of its working-age women in the workforce.

Reflecting the tacit, driving conservative presuppositions of neoliberalism, while integration reformists did not argue that the *character* of *women* is subverted where their employment statistics are low, they nonetheless reproduce the culture of poverty discourse in proposing that welfare for immigrants in particular produces a "negative impact of inactivity on hopes and habits" (OECD 2007b). It is at first glance unclear

	Catholic-conservative (8 OECD countries)	Liberal (7 OECD countries)	Social- democratic (4 OECD countries)	Out of 19 countries
Male immigrant employment higher than male native employment	Italy (+17%), Greece (+12%), Portugal (+4%), Spain (+6%)	USA (+6%)	OLCD countries)	Describes 5 countries, mostly Catholic- conservative
Male immigrant employment roughly equal to male native employment	Austria (0.3% immigrants' favor)	Ireland (2% natives' favor), Canada (2% natives' favor)		Describes 3 countries
Male native employment higher than male immigrant employment	France (+5%), Germany (7%), Belgium (11%)	Australia (+5%), United Kingdom (+6%), the Netherlands (15%) Switzerland (+4.5%)	Norway (+6%), Finland (+4.6%), Sweden (+12%), Denmark (+21%)	Describes 11 countries, across ideal types
Low male native employment, below 75%	Italy (69%), Greece (72%), Portugal (75%), Spain (73%), France (70%), Germany (71%), Belgium (68.5%)	USA (73.5%), Ireland (74.7%)	Finland (70%)	Describes 10 countries, mostly Catholic- conservative
High female native employment, at or over 65%		Australia (72%), Switzerland (73%), United Kingdom (67%), USA (66%), Canada (70%), the Netherlands (68%)	Finland (67.5%), Denmark (73%), Sweden (74%), Norway (73%)	Describes 10 countries, Liberal and Social- democratic
High female immigrant employment, at or over 60%	Portugal (67%), Austria (60.5%)	Australia (65%), Switzerland (63%), Canada (61%)	Norway (62%), Sweden (60%)	Describes 7 countries, across ideal types

Table 1	2003 OECD Political-Economic	c Development Strategy.	by Immigrant Employment Level

Source: OECD (2005), derived from Table I.A1.1.

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how conservative liberals are willing to imagine that the character of *native women* is *not* subverted by exclusion from the labor market and subordination to male protection, yet suppose at the same time that the character of other people, including male and especially female immigrants, *is* subverted by social-state support. This case makes it particularly clear that conservatism discreetly supplements and props up the floppy liberal presupposition of virtue as conferred by private property.

The relative lack of women in the Catholic labor market appears to have a geographic relation to how immigrants are used within the Catholic-conservative labor market—some Catholic-conservative states employ immigrants intensively (Austria, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain); others do not (Belgium, France, Germany). In the EU integration, with Germany creaming the manufacture of high-quality durable goods for Europe, the type of business firms that operated in economically subordinated southern Europe were by and large left to specialize in low labor cost production rather than production spurring technological or human capital development. Telling exceptions include the more independent cooperative regions such as Emilia-Romagna and the Basque region, with their high "small state"-like coordination capacity, resistance to techno-economic subordination, and democratic ability to innovate, technologically and socially.

The geographic, gender, and immigrant-status patterns in the OECD countries' labor markets suggest that different locations and kinds of regimes devise a few different formulas for utilizing and disciplining labor power. In Figure 1, I compare the two kinds of difference in labor market employment across selected OECD countries. Many Catholic-conservative and Liberal countries use women as unremunerated care providers, where men are paid "family wages" to support women as dependents. In most but not all of these countries, immigrants have had high rates of employment since 1980. However, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, and Italy, which do not specialize in low-tech production, have large gaps between the rate of native male employment. Actually existing social-democratic Sweden shows small-state resilience as the labor market *mirror image* of the EU center, Germany, and, to a lesser extent, Austria.

It is likely that such patterns support a structure of market niches within the OECD, such as varying percentages of firms that utilize high human capital, versus plentiful, cheap low human capital, and varying amounts of capillary-patriarchal, commodified, or socialized care service delivery (Table 2). It comes as no surprise that after the demise of full employment policy, social-democratic Sweden, with a high human capital labor force and much state-supported care service, is the type of state that employs women at high levels and immigrants at lower levels. It is attention-piquing that Sweden's integration of immigrants was at the turn of the twenty-first century commonly compared unfavorably—and without full disclosure—to Austria's integration of immigrants. Austria is one of only three OECD countries that currently have roughly equal native and immigrant employment rates, corresponding to a political-economic mix that keeps women working without pay, produces a robust number of low-skill-employing firms, dumps immigrants outside of the borders in economic downturns, and generates particularly acrimonious native-immigrant relations.




Figure 1 Exclusion from the Labor Market: Flexible Immigrant Labor Force versus Unremunerated Female Care Providers

Notes: White columns: Comparative Difference between the Average Immigrant to Native Employment Rate, 1980–2001. Black columns: Comparative Difference between the Native Male-to-Female Employment Rate, 2003. Data derived from van Tubergen, Maas, and Flap (2004: 715) and OECD (2005) Tables 1.A1.1 and 1.A1.2.

How appropriate are the abstracting policy terms "inclusion" or "economic integration"? There is a fair case to be made that a large community of low-skill, male Yugoslavian migrants have a traditional place in a segment of the Austrian labor market. But given the tensions labor immigration causes in Austria, as well as the tenuous citizenship status immigrants have in Austria, it should be controversial to claim that that norm is what we mean by "inclusion" or "integration." Both of these terms imply a social as well as a labor market dimension. As an operationalization of "integration" or "inclusion," Austria's immigrant "economic inclusion" would satisfy only a small cadre of state bureaucrats with a very specific budget-balancing mandate and very limited discretion. Immigration policy evaluations should recognize the signature capitalist trade-off between border porousness (qua liberty) and the strength and distribution of citizenship rights (representative justice) in the state.⁶

Conservative-Liberal Inclusion: Social Immobility and Racialization

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Immigrant inclusion has been a main rationale for creating the conditions for liquidating public assets and state responsibilities to the working class, via the

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Risks	Social-Democratic Swedish Model	Liberal Austrian Model
High human capital work opportunities for immigrants?	Yes	Few
Abundant work for immigrants?	Not since 1990. 64% immigrant (male and female) employment rate in Sweden in 2005.	Yes, during economic boom; in 2003, immigrant and native Austrian men shared a 75% employment rate.
Work for immigrant women?	Ethnic-Swedish women (75%) are far more likely to be employed than immigrant women (60%).	Labor immigration policy requirements discourage women from immigrating.
Work quality	High	Low
Social exclusion: Cost of unemployment to immigrant	Unemployment assistance; retraining; education; entrepreneurship	Revocation of residency permit
Discrimination in labor market?	Yes	Yes
Outcomes for immigrants' children	Equivalent to native population	Equivalent to native population
Anti-immigrant hostility: Public largely assigns blame for immigrants' unemployment on:	Mixed: Immigrants, immigrants' culture, racism, welfare, labor market, social democracy.	Targeted: Immigrants, immigrants' culture.

Table 2 Employment Trade-offs for Immigrants in Social-Democratic Sweden versus the Austrian Model

Source: Based on Kogan (2003).

increased commodification of labor and divisive income inequality. The OECD was a leading institution in the international power-pressure campaign to alter Swedish labor markets, ostensibly in order to combat "economic exclusion." Its recommendations backed the 2004–2014 bourgeois government's reform program (OECD 2007b). Just prior to the European economic crisis, the OECD urged,


As the economy may now be hit by more frequent structural shocks than some decades ago, reallocation of labor may be increasingly important and add to the pertinence of traditional insider-outsider problems. Making the labor market more inclusive and flexible is therefore a key challenge. (OECD 2007b)

Following neoclassical-economic consensus, the OECD placed the blame for discrimination in Sweden on labor market regulations and "a compressed wage structure"—low income inequality. Sweden was shamed as "discriminating" against immigrants because policy did not foster a large number of low-wage jobs.⁷ According to the OECD's neoclassical economics moral theory, discrimination should be eradicated by simply increasing the number of low-quality jobs, lauded as "conditions that match their (immigrants' low) competence and education."⁸

The complete neoliberal OECD prescription for "making employment inclusive" was to lower wages, diminish welfare, and abolish the state income tax (OECD 2007b). Neoliberal reform has impacted countries to different degrees. To see where the effect of neoliberal-prescribed labor and immigration policy reform is the most pronounced, I compare van Tubergen's longitudinal data to the 2003 difference in native male and male immigrant employment.⁹ The social-democratic countries Sweden and Finland have had more consistent policies over the recent decades—relative policy integrity, indicative of maintaining small-state sovereignty, whereas many other countries' latest employment practices (in white) appear to be at manic variance from their average employment practices between 1980 and 2003 (in black, see Figure 2).¹⁰

Except in the social-democratic countries, we find the growth of the junk job sector high and increasing throughout the OECD. By contrast, it appears that a well-developed welfare state discourages the growth of precarious work. While the OECD finds that few Swedish (6.4%) and Finnish (7%) workers struggle to survive on low-wage jobs, conservative-liberal economies are heavily dependent on low-wage labor markets.

While the US has had a consistently large low-wage sector since at least 1979 (the year such data became available), Germany increased its low-wage segment from 11% of the labor force in 1995 to 16% in 2005. Poland increased its low-wage segment from 17% of the working population to 23.5%. Korea increased its low-wage labor market segment from 23% to 25.4%. Japan (16%), Spain (16%), Canada (22%), and the UK (21%) have similarly large low-wage labor markets that have grown slightly over the decade.¹¹



■ 1980-2003 average difference □ 2003 difference in employment gap

Figure 2 How Do Labor Markets Vary and How Are They Changing? Native-immigrant Employment Gaps: Averages over 24 years and the Employment Gap in 2003 Source: OECD (2007a).

The OECD claimed that these metastasized junk jobs sectors benefit "immigrants and natives alike." Can we say then that conservative-liberal countries are making better progress toward everyone's economic and social inclusion, as immigration, integration, and labor market reformists have asserted? Given Howell and Diallo's findings in the US, as well as Slaverda et al.'s findings (2000) across the OECD, it is not accurate to say that the conservative-liberal countries have been more effective in wiping out economic exclusion, especially if we consider the impact of job quality on economic exclusion, as do Howell and Diallo (2007).

Where the low-wage labor market segment has been enlarged, immigration economists find that low-skilled, low-educated natives lose economically. Labor economists find that in the leading liberal country, the US, economic exclusion has increasingly afflicted moderately educated (high school to some college-educated) citizens (Borjas 1999). Immigrants do not necessarily benefit from reduced native welfare. Schmitt and Zipperer find that the US performs comparatively poorly in "incorporating traditionally disadvantaged groups into the paid labor force" (2006: 1).

It is more accurate to say that some countries trade off a degree of immigrant unemployment for marginal employment and native unemployment. This tradeoff comes with its own set of exclusions. Schmitt and Zipperer (2006, 16) of the Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) identify these exclusions as income inequality, poverty, unequal education and health, and incarceration.

The exclusion trade-off is political, involving differences in class compromise across countries. In an effort to harmonize their policies with the uniform neoliberal prescription of diminishing the welfare state and husbanding tertiary firms, many countries oversaw an influx of "negative" labor immigration and a massive relative increase in their native male unemployment rate. Whether immigrant employment was too low or native employment was sinking, the OECD's prescription was always the same: get rid of welfare supports and enlarge the tertiary firms sector and the secondary labor market; then presumably labor will come to heel, which must, despite state policy enforcing "natural" rates of unemployment, be the unique driver of unemployment.

Economist Robert Pollin (2003) shows that unemployment statistics are lowered by such anti-working-class policy in the US, but economic and social exclusion have nonetheless increased, not declined. In Pollin's (2003) analysis, junk jobs play the same role in neoliberal countries that unemployment is supposed to. Junk jobs deplete quality of life and discipline workers. In the small European countries that have worked to conform to the liberal model promoting junk jobs and removing welfare supports, we have found continuing evidence of unemployment shifted to the native subpopulation. The removal of welfare has nothing to do with reducing economic exclusion in a society.

Is the conservative-liberal model a one-size-fits-all solution for economic growth, or a path-dependent niche strategy that works through a highly coercive

labor market saliently including historical slavery, indentured servitude, unregulated business, racial segregation, and extensive and racialized imprisonment?¹² Looking down the road, we have to notice that the conservative-liberal high inequality model is damaging to the health of workers and requires increased healthcare expenditures. Following the US's model could put further fiscal strain on states with public healthcare in an era in which populations are aging. It is a liberal article of faith, unsupported by social epidemiological data, that a lifetime of bad jobs is better than an occasional bout with no job and welfare supports.

According to the steady stream of social exclusion studies, social epidemiological and epigenetic findings, and contributions such as Benjamin Radcliff's *The Political Economy of Happiness* (2013), the low-inequality social-democratic path of good jobs and high employment provides measurably better outcomes for a very high number of people, permits women to be semi-independent economic actors; permits women and men to enjoy fuller participation in their families, communities, polities, and societies; promotes health, longevity, and healthcare expenditure savings throughout the population; increases human capital and fully activated citizens. As well, it appears to permit economic integrity and dynamism where small countries would be otherwise subjugated to and disrupted by the centralizing global monopoly capitalist accumulation drive.

Surely, "exclusion" is not what integration reformists are trying to reduce through reforming labor market policy. That social-democratic economic dynamism fails to appeal to neoliberals has less to do with the welfare of new members of society than it has to do with the balance of decision-making power between classes, as well as centers of power. Regulating and moderating the exploitative and appropriating relation of capital over labor and reproduction, social democracy simply fails to provide capitalists the satisfaction of accumulation without social and environmental constraint.

Neoliberalizing neoclassical economics theory holds that working-class responsible states instruct such vulnerable groups as immigrants to be "dependent" on welfare hand-outs, to drain rather than contribute to society. According to migration economists, nefarious "special interest groups" maintain the welfare that holds immigrants in the thrall of a culture of poverty (Borjas 1999, 107–12). Even in the US, economist George Borjas is deeply disturbed at immigrants' propensity to "assimilate into the welfare state" (Borjas 1999, 107). Refugees, he warns, are even more "disturbing."

The high propensity of refugee households to enter and stay in the welfare system may be the result of misguided government policies designed to ease the transition of refugees into the United States. Persons who enter the country as refugees have immediate access to a wide array of social services and programs that neither other legal immigrants nor natives qualify for. (Borjas 1999, 109)

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The integration reform prescription was that the welfare state must be dismantled, to save "tax-payers" from being dragged down by individuals who need to learn to pull themselves up by their bootstraps, and to save these immigrants from their own descent into a culture of poverty. Why do only some populations submit to the so-called culture of poverty in conservative-liberal theory?

Immigration politics invoke questions of who can and cannot enjoy full citizenship, and in conservative-liberal societies, race provides a lot of the answers. In the US, for example, the consensus on those questions was often rooted in racial formation and changed over time. Not just socialists, supporters of the French Revolution, the poor, and non-Protestants have been regarded in policy and consensus as incapable of being resocialized "in the American mold," but First Nations people, African Americans, the Chinese, and the Japanese were all considered inassimilable (Zolberg 2006, 432). Members of groups considered incapable of being resocialized in the national mold are sometimes not allowed to immigrate; but an alternate approach is that they are allowed to immigrate-if they are racialized and without state protection of adequate citizenship rights.¹³ Where the secondary labor market is large and unions density is just a little over 12%, as in the liberal US, unskilled immigrants admitted after 1973 have suffered many forms of permanent, cross-generational, and racialized inequality exclusions, as they languish with noto-limited citizenship rights, social-citizenship inclusion, wage mobility, and class mobility since their arrival (Raijman and Tienda 1999, 254). Racial groups can be "wanted" for cheap labor, without being "welcome," as Zolberg (and the US's I.C.E. prison system) has shown. Integration reformists' prescriptions gloss the membership distinction between wanted and welcome.

New suburban historians such as Kevin Kruse (2005) and Thomas Sugrue (1996) have documented how racism has fueled campaigns against public goods and services in the US, beginning in the Civil Rights Era decades before even the racial politics of the 1990s welfare retrenchment. They show that racism also undergirds the popular US myth that markets are "fair," which conservative-liberal policy depends on for legitimacy. Thus, the political resonance of the segmented labor market depends on circulating the notion that junk jobs constitute for immigrants in particular a fair, rather than a highly exploitative or depleting, fate or "entrance" into the labor market and mainstream society.

This claim of fairness is rooted in the supplemental assumption of social mobility. Based on Portes and Zhou's (1996) investigations of Cuban, Korean, and Chinese immigrant communities, neoliberal institutions, such as the OECD, have claimed that segmented labor markets can facilitate fair social mobility.¹⁴ Investigating this claim further, however, Douglas Massey disagrees. He points out that the social-mobility version of the segmented labor market model is not widely applicable to the immigrant experience because it requires the convergence

of three rare conditions: geographic concentration, that the first round of immigrants be entrepreneurs with access to wealth, and that there is a steady stream of new, lower-class workers of the same ethnicity (Massey 1999, 39). Despite the legitimation of race and the inaccurate promises of social mobility, segmented labor markets are not usually a basis for democratic development.

The neoclassical theory of the welfare state pedagogy of dependence is based in the material interest of increasing immigrant dependency on junk jobs sector employers. Removing "threshold barriers" for making immigrants dependent upon these employers usually depends on a system of racism. Suzanne Model shows that where immigrants can claim more positive outcomes in the US as compared with the UK, it is because they are inserted above African Americans, who are consigned by a nationalist-racist tradition to the lowest position in the labor queue (Model 1997, 2005; Model and Ladipo 1996). It would be surprising if making labor market entrance easy would change the distribution of unemployment in a country in which immigrants are the low race on the social hierarchy.

Anti-immigrant, Islamophobic, and racist politics undergird integration reform politics in Sweden as in the US and elsewhere. Europe in general has seen racial formation in the rise of an understanding of Muslim immigrants as having an essential culture that is inassimilable even under multicultural conditions. But even in Europe, Koopmans et al. (2005, 173–77) have found that Muslim immigrants only very infrequently demand special cultural rights incompatible with Western democracy. Western anxiety about the multicultural integration of Muslims could well focus less on Muslims' supposedly "essential" political-religious difference, and more on how imperial relations can be reformed in the Middle East.¹⁵ Socialist traditions and labor-driven internationalism can provide such a bridge.

Because racism functions to dissipate working-class resources and capacities, unions and union federations have a profound stake in contributing directly to immigrant integration as well as immigration policy. Where capitalist metropoles ensconced in big states unleash economic, political, and cultural forces limiting multiculturalism's protections, anti-racist humanism and internationalism are needed much more profoundly within unions. Promoting a critical mass of labor movement ethnic minorities to positions of responsibility and authority is an important way that the labor unions and the labor union federations can combat the racialization that threatens working people.

In the twenty-first century, unfavorable European Court labor rulings and the 2006 Bolkestein Directive have pushed organized Swedish labor to cede control over immigration priorities to capital. Unions have decreasing influence over labor protection and labor market development in Sweden. Internationalism, connecting with and organizing with migrant workers across borders, has become increasingly

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important to unions and union confederations in Sweden; and Sweden's diverse New Swede union members can play a crucial role in this new phase.

Social-Democratic Reproduction: High Integration Capacity and Small-state Sovereignty

No one claimed that *refugee* and family reunion integration is better anywhere than Sweden. Even when considering its incremental measures to reduce immigration and the growth since 2010 of the reactionary Sweden Democrat organization, the massive role played by the small country of 9.8 million, along with Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan, in welcoming each year since 2013 between 70,000 and 160,000 Kurdish and other Syrian, Afghan, and Iraqi refugees of today's Middle Eastern militarized disruption program attests to a willingness and extraordinary state, societal and cultural capacity that outshines other affluent countries. The ideological, political claim has been that immigrant inclusion is better in countries that have deregulated their labor markets and diminished their welfare states. Immigrants, portrayed as both deviants and victims, have been the racialized face of trouble; but it was social-democratic labor strength that reformists want *fixed*. Neoliberal institutions such as the OECD have termed labor markets in socialdemocratic countries both "rigid" and "unbalanced." They blamed labor market "imbalances" across Europe, not only for the failure of "globalization of production and the liberalization of commodity trade and capital markets . . . to equalize standards of living across the world" but also for problems with immigrants within countries (Katseli 2004).

Among the "rigid" structures to blame for "imbalances," the OECD pointed to labor movement achievements that not only keep 15- to 24-year-olds in school and out of the labor market, but also fail to support publically subsidized private businesses and low-quality jobs. Professor Louka Katseli, OECD economist and London's CEPR fellow, explains,

Labor market imbalances are attributable largely to structural rigidities. These include, among other things, the lack of interregional geographic mobility aggravated by linguistic barriers, restrictions that reserve access to specific professions only to nationals, mismatches between existing skills and those in high demand, and cultural and socio-economic barriers that preclude the entry of nationals into low-status or low-wage jobs. (Katseli 2004)

To tear down such "structural rigidities," the OECD proposed that people without social-democratic citizenship are the ideal population for staffing—they do not say building—new low-wage job_sectors. Sweden has to build a

larger low-wage sector to conform to these prescriptions, and the conservative government did its best to oblige between 2008 and 2013 (Anxo and Ericson 2015). Yet a secondary labor market cannot solve the problems of immigrant exclusion. As economists Howell and Diallo (2007) show, employment exclusion includes precarious and insufficient work as well as unemployment. Sweden's social-democratic small-state strategy has provided resilience to such exclusion. Prior to the Syrian influx, only 6% of the Swedish workforce was low-wage.¹⁶ Only 5% of the working-age Swedish population was unemployed.¹⁷ Those are very low statistics for aggregate economic exclusion in a capitalist country.

Sweden has abandoned the social-democratic full employment bias (in favor of the neoliberal anti-inflationary bias), and so there will be unemployment. Even if a reduction in workplace and hiring discrimination is achieved to lessen the gap between immigrant and ethnic Swedes' employment rates, and even if unions promote their refugee members, on aggregate refugees may still be less competitive than native Swedes in the labor market in Sweden. It should not be beyond the pale of discussion to consider that for the non-affluent, dislocation and the destruction of refugees' lives and communities can handicap workers in a competitive labor market, and beyond utilitarian calculation, that what traumatized people need more than depleting junk jobs is an array of supports to help them reproduce not simply their bodies and elites' yacht comforts from day to day, but their children, communities, and society as well. The Swedish state has intervened in these compromising immigrant conditions, but since the end of the 1990s, they were only able to dampen exclusion for first-generation refugees. However, thanks to the social-democratic emphasis on human development and reducing inequality through enabling class mobility, second-generation immigrants have more success (Ekberg 1997). Sweden remains one of the most capable and desirable migration destinations in the world. The problem plaguing first-generation refugees to Sweden is that Sweden accepts more immigrants, relative to its population and landmass, than it has work for, since the neoliberalizing 1980s when the country stopped pursuing full employment and yet continued depriving Germany of a monopoly on the high-skills, high-human capital market.

In 2006, Swedish voters—including a majority of immigrant voters, elected a bourgeois government, which increased labor immigration. Through a lawsuit brought to the European Court of Human Rights by immigrant laborers, the Swedish government was ordered in February 2007 to enable nonunion workers to opt out of minimal service fees that allow the union to monitor working conditions. This application of Article 11 of the Human Rights Convention—the right to "negative freedom of association"—assists employers to marshal select employees to break unions, with the goal of crippling and silencing a major institutional voice for independent policies that not only benefit working people but also enrich

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public debate and policymaking for small-state integrity. It is a significant further blow to the social-democratic Swedish model, which is based on a high level of trade union participation and collective agreements.

Despite the conservative government introducing an unprotected secondary labor market with new labor-immigration and secondary labor market policies in 2008 and 2010, however, the way was not cleared for a conversion to a more complete neoliberalization of Sweden. Even near the start of their reign, the conservative coalition was pushed to scramble toward more modest agendas and expressions of liberal social values, before the electorate finally kicked them out in favor of a new, explicitly internationalist and labor-oriented Social Democrat political platform in 2014. A popular rejection of the small state's social-democratic workingclass institutions has not yet been won in Sweden, despite the large, intense, and unrelenting international capitalist power-pressure, its hegemonic discourse, its armies of tacticians, and their ploys.

Yet continuing high levels of immigration and years of immigration politics have had ample impact on the small country. About 57% of Swedes see immigration as the top issue in the country (European Commission 2016). The reactionary Sweden Democrat Party convinced 13% of conservative voters to hive off the pro-*labor*-immigration bourgeois coalition in 2014. Newcomers to Sweden seize occasional global attention (such as Donald Trump's February 2017 spotlight on the "failed" nation) to riot and otherwise publicly demonstrate their demand for recognition and redistribution.

From the turn of the twenty-first century Swedish small-state case, we see that unions not only need to take refugees especially seriously as among the most vulnerable segments of their labor constituency, but that they also have to understand the various ways in which capitalist class opponents have used immigrant social, cultural, network, and citizenship vulnerabilities in a hegemonic war of maneuver. Refugees' and family-reunification immigrants' comparatively tenuous ties to the labor market in a neoliberal shock-doctrine crisis played a key pawn role in the international neoliberal mobilization to weaken the global working class and to dismantle the Swedish small state's geopolitical strategy, its socialist-inspired, labor-responsive social-democratic institutions and reproduction-supportive social citizenship. To be sure, discrimination against immigrants is widely practiced by employers, and they have a responsibility to reform their practices. Yet that responsibility is merely moral and is weighed against business owners' more pressing need to drive down wages and the bargaining power of workers. Labor unions, on the other hand, have an interest in immigrants' welfare that connects them to the continuous reconstruction of a thriving small state.

Starting in its foundation in socialist and women's (e.g., temperance) movements, actually existing social democracy has recognized that capillary

governmentality is not an innovation—its conservative form has long been the patriarchy that supplements liberalism. Backed by global and regional insurgency, Swedish social democrats early on developed a distinctive socialist-feminist governmentality.¹⁸ Because it has recognized *both* the (minor but key) exploitation and (major) appropriation aspects of capitalism, Sweden has among the best job market outcomes for women, native and immigrant, in the OECD. Furthermore, it is the strong, capillary incorporation of households' female labor in the state that secures small social-democratic states some degree of sovereignty against the past half-century of capitalists and their metropoles' neoliberalizing onslaught. For resisting the corrosive, depleting, and disruptive commodification and appropriation initiatives emanating from capitalism's metropole coffers, the orientation to social and biological reproduction and the governmentality innovations of actually existing social democracy still matter.

Notes

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- 1. To make any claim about the need to scrap social democracy in favor of a more "market-oriented" approach, we ought to have a reasonable, empirical understanding of the market ideal. Using Current Population Survey data (United States Census Bureau 2006), we find that in one exemplary market-oriented country, the US, neither native entrepreneurs nor immigrant entrepreneurs have very high incomes, on average. The average annual income of self-employed immigrants is \$20,710. That is \$2,263 more than self-employed natives. More to the point, Portes and Zhou (1996) show that in the US, immigrant workers also report a higher average income than do immigrant entrepreneurs. Given that the self-employed tend to claim many tax deductions that workers cannot, and so contribute less to public wealth, it is not surprising that in official statistics, on average, entrepreneurs' income can look smaller than workers' income. Even within a "market-oriented" state, the success of small businesses is not guaranteed. The US Small Business Administration reported in June 2006 that one-third of new employer firms in the United States fail within two years, and about 66% fail by four years. The real point of contrast is that in the United States, the costs of unemployment are much more severe than in social democracies. Moreover, because the Swedish social wage and social-democratic welfare state standard of living is high, if immigrant entrepreneurs' official incomes are somewhat lower on average (average gross income of individual immigrant non-entrepreneurs in 1998 was roughly \$22,500, whereas the average self-employed income was roughly \$15,000 in Sweden), it cannot be assumed that immigrants would be better off with slightly higher incomes and a significantly reduced social wage under a liberal regime that transfers subsidies to tertiary sector firm owners.
- 2. For example, the European Research Centre on Migration and Ethnic Relations (ERCOMER).
- 3. The third principle has been dropped (see Esping-Anderson 1990, 223).
- 4. Waldinger and Gilbertson (1994) have shown that highly educated immigrant women in the US have been unable to convert education into out-competing natives for high status occupations. While "there is now broad consensus that immigrant women attain some limited, albeit uneven and sometimes contradictory, benefits from migration and settlement," to what degree immigrant women secure improved status in the home, workplace, or community in the US remains unclear (see Pessar 1999).

- There are 30 member countries in total; 19 of the wealthiest keep these data and are in this OECD data set.
- 6. Opposing the Enlightenment definition of freedom as *egaliberte*, the conservative-liberal tradition (Hobbes [1651] 1968) argues for a naturalistic reconceptualization of liberty as properly restricted to a bodily mobility, while other conservative theorists tend to systematically identify absolute elite liberty with liberty proper. Nancy Fraser (2013) stresses that with the circumventing and routing of the Keynesian-Westphalian state, we can no longer assume the representative justice necessary for distribution and recognition justice—democracy as participation parity.
- 7. As Social Democratic Party leader Mona Sahlin (1999) noted, there is a silent struggle between policy makers over the term "flexible work." Flexible work in the social-democratic tradition means high-quality working conditions that accommodate workers and the reproduction of their families, whereas in the liberal tradition "flexible work" means workers who sacrifice themselves and their families to cushion business fluctuations by, for example, working overtime without overtime pay, working shifts at all hours of the day, going without work and pay and social supports for periods, and so on. Despite the capacity of either approach to support moral claims, there are profound differences between flexible working conditions that accommodate social reproductive activities and those that deprive working women and men of control over their working conditions.
- If the OECD's economic assumptions about discrimination were valid, we would expect to find little discrimination in the US, a leader in low-quality work as well as immigration.
- 9. Luxembourg's data in this chart come from 2001 (OECD 2005). Van Tubergen's 1980–2003 data does not include Norway. The data used to calculate the 2003 gap are segregated by gender, whereas the 1980–2003 average includes both men and women. However, comparing the 2003 female gap to the 1980–2003 average gap reinforces the above picture of increasing deviance from the average pattern.
- 10. Howell and Diallo (2007) show that the low-quality labor market has been a stable feature of the US since at least 1979. This is the labor market model that neoliberals seek to export.
- 11. Data are from the OECD Statistical Annex 2007, Table H. The OECD data on incidence of low pay, while ostensibly measured using the same criteria as Howell and Diallo (2007), report the US low pay incidence at the top of the OECD, but 5% lower than Howell and Diallo's findings for 2006. The OECD only has 1995 and 2005 low pay data on Australia, Canada, Germany Ireland, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Poland, Spain, Sweden, the UK, and the US.
- 12. According to US Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1 out of 37 Americans, for example, exists under penal supervision.
- 13. On the historical trade-off between open borders and citizenship rights, see Abraham (2008, 2010) and Hansen (2009).
- 14. In segmented labor market theory, the agent of immigration is the industrialized society's demand for labor. There are three driving engines to the imbalance that creates the segmented labor market: supply of/demand for labor, labor's demand for social hierarchy (the problems of motivation and structural inflation), and demographic changes that have removed women, teenagers, and rural-to-urban migrants from the bottom-rung of the labor pool. Major theorists of this perspective include Piore (1979). In addition, Portes and Manning (1986) reported on the Cuban "ethnic enclaves" social mobility strategy in Florida.
- 15. Anti-imperial politics in Sweden have done more to historicize, contextualize, and humanize Muslims in this way than many other countries, a point of complaint for imperialists in the US (see Caudwell, 2006). In the 2014 election, the SAP's Stephen Lofven campaigned successfully on an internationalist solidarity platform.

- 16. In contrast, neoliberal policies have contributed to a model US economy in which 30% of workers earn low wages (less than two-thirds the median wage for full-time workers), and 35% of the labor force is underemployed; only 40% of the working-age population in the US is considered adequately employed, according to economists David R. Howell and Mamadou Diallo (2007).
- 17. According to *World Fact Book* (Central Intelligence Agency 2006), the unemployment rate for the US in 2006 was 4.8%.
- 18. Not only did the Rehn-Meidner model design and implement socialist-feminist incentives, but also, for example, Per Albin Hansson's "Folkhemmet (People's Home)" (1928) influentially reformulated competing conservative patriarchal "home" reproduction ideology into a state-and-society building project oriented to a post-capitalist horizon.

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